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THE LOGIC OF CHINA-ASEAN FTA 
Economic Statecraft of 
"Peaceful Ascendancy" 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
INTRODUCTION: RISING CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The regional political and economic order in East Asia' has undergone a 
significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. One of the most 
important changes is China's growing clout and influence in this region. 
Several important factors contribute to this development: China's rapid and 
sustained economic growth (on average 9 per cent per year over the past two 
decades), Japan's relative decline as a result of its decade-long recession, the 
1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis that decimated several high-flying Asian 
economies, and the stretching-thin of the United States' military resources 
and political capital due to the war on terror, the daunting task of rebuilding 
Iraq, and the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea. 
Whereas China's rise in the mid- l 990s caused much concern among its 
neighbours and the United States, 2 China's further ascent in the early 2000s 
has instead generated more equanimity. This shift presents not only an 
intellectual puzzle but also an important policy question. China's expanding 
economy is now regarded more as an opportunity than a threat, and its more 
polished foreign policy exudes confidence and poise.-1 
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One of the most dramatic events of the past decade was the announcement 
by ASEAN and China in November 2001 that they intended to create an 
FTA (Free Trade Area) between them within a decade. One year later, at the 
Eighth ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 
2002, ASEAN leaders and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji signed a Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation, which provided the. 
groundwork for the eventual establishment of an ASEAN-China FTA by 
2010 for the older ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and 2015 for the newer members 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). The agreement went into force 
on 1 July 2003.4 
Comparing today with ASEAN's founding epoch, the contrasts cannot 
be more vivid: In 1967, China was mired in its angry self-imposed isolation 
called the Cultural Revolution, whereas ASEAN was established partly to 
form a collective counterweight against the regime that had exported 
revolutions and inspired guerrilla wars in Southeast Asia. Nowadays China is 
deeply engaged with the world and even assumes the hitherto unprecedented 
role as a trade promoter in East Asia. 
What explain these changes? What are the political and economic 
impetuses for the ASEAN-China FTA? What is the relationship between 
China's current trade offensive and its "new" foreign policy thinking? Does it 
signify a long-term and fundamental shift in China's economic statecraft or 
represent a short-term tactical expedient aimed at buying the crucial time 
needed for China to develop into an unparalleled power in the region capable 
of safeguarding its core interests? 
This chapter examines the ASEAN-China FTA in light of regionalism 
in East Asia and China's new diplomacy. It argues that China's FTA with the 
ASEAN is driven by a political logic to respond to challenges posed by 
competitive regionalisms in the world economy, to cement growing economic 
ties with Southeast Asian. nations, to secure raw materials crucial to its 
economic development, and to ensure a peaceful and stable environment 
close to home so as to buttress China's growing influence and counterbalance 
American and Japanese power. It is thus a concrete example of economic 
statecraft employed to facilitate China's new foreign policy strategy -
"peaceful ascendancy". ASEAN nations are attracted by the opportunities 
brought about by China's economic expansion and trade liberalization; they 
also seek to leverage their FTA with China to additional FTAs with important 
trading partners within (for example, Japan) or outside (for example, the 
United States) the region. However, because of the disparate levels of 
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development and policy priorities of its members, ASEAN's FTA with 
China is likely to cause various challenges to individual members and the 
organization as a whole. 
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part is an introduction 
setting up the issue. The second part offers some background on regional 
trading arrangements, emphasizing the proliferation of such arrangements in 
the 1990s. The third part reviews rhe profiles of China's economic interactions 
with ASEAN. The fourth part examines the main political calculus in China's 
decision to pursue FTA with ASEAN, paying special attention to the larger 
strategic factors associated with China's desire to attain "peaceful ascendancy". 
The last part looks at some of the issues raised by ASEAN-China FTA and 
speculates i•s eventual success. 
RISE OF REGIONALISM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Regional economic integration - the deepening of intra-regional economic 
interdependence in a given region, through intra-regional trade, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and harmonization of commercial regulations, 
standards, and practices - probably predated the Westphalian international 
system. Regionalism is the political movement towards the creation or 
expansion of regional trade organizations or associations. 5 
The proliferation of regional trading blocs - often known as regional 
integration agreements (RIAs) - and the deepening of relationships among 
existing members of certain trading blocs are among the major developments 
in international relations in recent decades. Most industrial and developing 
countries in the world are members of a regional integration agreement, and 
many belong to more than one: over one-half of world trade rakes place 
within such agreements.6 
The past decade witnessed an especially sharp increase in regional trade 
agreements (RTAs).7 According to World Trade Organization (WTO) figures, 
as the end of 2002, a total of 259 RTAs had been notified to rhe WTO and 
its predecessor, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); among 
them 176 RTAs are currently in force. An additional 70 RTAs are believed to 
be operational but not yet notified, and about 70 are under negotiation. 
Among WTO's 146 members, only Mongolia is not. already in a RTA or 
engaged in negotiations on preferential agreements. 8 
One important reason for the increasing popularity of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) is the seemingly difficult process and bleak prospects for 
progress on the multilateral agenda - the latest example being the collapse 
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of the WTO meeting in September 2003, after which U.S. trade representative 
Robert Zoellick warned that the United States might press ahead with bilateral 
and regional trade deals.9 
Table 2.1 shows that 43 per cent of world merchandise trade now occurs 
under the umbrella of preferential trade agreements. If all RTAs currently 
under negotiation are successfully concluded b~fore 2005, then over 50 per 
cent of world merchandise trade will occur among countries linked by 
preferential agreements. 
Table 2.1 also shows that as of now, Western Europe leads in preferential 
trade (hence it evokes the image of "Fortress Europe"), whereas Asia is the 
least-prone to trade on preferential terms. Indeed, the current proliferation of 
PTAs in Asia to a considerable extent represents a "catch-up" phenomenon. 
PTAs are the obverse of the principle of non-discrimination trade policies. 
The Anglo-American Allies that planned the world economic system after 
World War II - which became known as the Bretton Woods system -
believed that the discriminatory trade policies in the 1930s had contributed 
to the collapse of world trade and in turn to the Great Depression. They 
enshrined the non-discrimination policy into Article I of the GATT, requiring 
(unconditional) most-favoured nation (MFN) for all GATT members.10 
However, since its outset, the GATT allowed a major deviation from the 
MFN principle. Article XXIV states that a group of countries may form a free 
TABLE2.1 
Preferential Trade Share of intra-RTAs Trade in 
Merchandise Imports of Major Regions, 2000 and 2005 
(as of January 2003) 
2000 2005 
Western Europe 64.7 67.0 
Transitional economies 61.6 61.6 
North America (incl. Mexico) 41.4 51.6 
Africa 37.2 43.6 
Middle East 19.2 38.l 
Latin America (excl. Mexico} 18.3 63.6 
Asia 5.6 16.2 
World 43.2 51.2 
Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2003, Geneva: 
WTO, 2003, p. 48. 
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trade area or custom union, dropping barriers among themselves, subject to 
a few requirements. 11 
Levels of Integration 
Several formal regional trading agreements that denote differing levels 
integration need to be distinguished. 12 
(1) Preferential Trade Arrangements: The loosest type of arrangement 
is the granting of partial preferences to a set of trading partners. If the 
concessions are one-way, we term this a preferential trade arrangement - as 
seen in the unilateral concessions made by an industrialized country to less 
developed eountries (LDCs), a practice that the GATT always permitted. If 
the concessions are reciprocal, we may call it preferential trade area (PTA) to 
describe the club of nations covered. 
(2) Free Trade Area (FTA): If the members of a PTA eliminate all tariffs 
and quantitative import restrictions among themselves - that is, I 00 per 
cent preferences - then they form a ftee trade area (FTA). They typically 
retain varying levels of tariffs and other barriers against the products of 
non-members. 13 
(3) Custom Union (CU): The next level of integration occurs when the 
members of an FTA go beyond removing trade barriers among themselves 
and set a common level of trade barriers vis-a-vis outsiders. This at a minimum 
entails a common external tariff, which is no higher than the average of the 
previously existing tariffs of the member countries. A full CU will set all trade 
policy for its members as a whole. 
(4) Common Market: PTA, FTA, and CU are different models of 
"shallow integration'', whereas common market and economic union constitute 
"deep integration". Beyond the free exchange of goods and se~ among 
members, a common market entails the free movement of factors of production: 
labour and capital. 
(5) Economic Union: Economic union involves harmonizing national 
economic policies, including typically taxes and a common currency. 
The European Union (EU) is the best example of a long process of 
increased level of integration and the most notable economic union. In 
contrast, neither the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) nor the members of ASEAN FTA expect to literally eliminate all 
interior barriers to trade, as the name "free trade area" would imply. It should 
also be pointed out that not all trade among preferential trading partners 
takes place at preferential rates. Most agreem"ents exclude certain sensitive 
sectors (for example, agriculture). 
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Motivations for Integration 
Why do nations pursue regional integration? Largely speaking they do it for 
two sets of reasons: (1) politics and policymaking, and (2) economics. 
As a World Bank publication asserts, "Regional integration is good 
politics: It meets political needs, such as security or enhanced bargaining 
power, and it satisfies influential lobbies."14 Indeed, the main motivation for 
regional integration is often political, rather than economic. The first 
motivation is to use integration to consolidate peace and increase regional 
security. It is ~ften assumed that creating linkages between economies can 
make conflicts more costly. Both Immanuel Kant's third definitive article of 
"perpetual peace" - cosmopolitan law15 - and Thomas Friedman's "Golden 
Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention16 affirm this insight. In the post-9/11 
environment, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick justified his aggressive 
pursuit of FTAs with such nations as Jordan, Israel, Chile, Singapore, Australia, 
Morocco, southern Africa, and Western Hemisphere on national security 
ground. He argued, "While terrorism isn't caused by poverty ... failed states, 
broken societies, extreme poverty, create the fertile ground in which the seeds 
of terrorism can grow, and therefore we have a very strong interest in having 
a pro-growth and opportunity economic policy that complements our security 
agenda. "17 Clearly the United States expected important strategic and political 
benefits from these FTAs, since the economic benefits were modest. 
Second, by joining together the weak can become strong. Governments 
often seek to acquire greater bargaining power in rhultilateral negotiations by 
first tying in partner countries through regional commitments. At a regional 
level, a subset of countries could first strike their own agreement in order to 
increase bargaining power and press for a better outcome. 
Third, regional agreements have been used to lock in institutional 
changes and reforms. For trade liberalization, regional agreements are a 
well-designed piece of commitment mechanism because they are built upon 
reciprocal preferences. 
Fourth, vested interests, such as powerful national bureaucracies set up to 
negotiate trade agreements, or certain sectors of the society that stand to gain 
or lose, often lobby the governments to seek regional agreements. 
Fifth, countries can benefit greatly from co-operation when they share 
resources - such as rivers, fishing grounds, hydroelectric power, or rail 
connection - or when they jointly to overcome problems - such as pollution 
and transportation bottlenecks. By virtue of enhanced trust, regional 
agreements can help in this regard. 
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Several economic rationales have also been marshaled for regional 
agreements, which can be summarized as the allure of reaping benefits from 
free trade without enduring the cost for adjustment. First, the theory of 
"second-best" holds that although multilateral agreements that aim at 
eliminating barriers across the board are almost always preferable, they are 
also more elusive. Hence, liberalization via a regional agreement might be 
more beneficial to the world than the status quo. 
A second economic reason for governments to seek discriminatory 
liberalization is that they may be able to reap gains from trade in product 
areas where they cannot compete internationally. RT As thus could serve the 
purpose of shutting out third-parry competition from more efficient 
suppliers. 
Third, small countries especially regard participation in regional agreements 
as a defensive necessity. They fear exclusion from markets and see participation 
as an insurance policy against being placed at a competitive disadvantage 
through discriminatory policies. Richard Baldwin calls this "domino theory" 
of regionalism - idiosyncratic incidents of regionalism triggered a multiplier 
effect that knocked down bilateral import barriers like a row of dominoes. 18 
As will be shown later, many of these characteristic political and economic 
considerations were clearly at work in the case of ASEAN-China FTA. 
ASEAN AND CHINA: CROWING MORE INTERDEPENDENT, 
BUT NOT THE WHOLE STORY 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original 
member states - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, 
Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, 
expanding its membership to ten. The last four entrants are also called newer 
members, or ASEAN-4. 
The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the 
Association are: (1) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous 
and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and (2) to promote 
regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of 
law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. 19 
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Despite these common aspirations, ASEAN members vary considerably 
- from the tiny oil-rich sultanate of Brunei (population: 300,000) to the 
world's fourth most populous nation (and the largest Muslim country), 
Indonesia; from the miniscule economy of Laos to the potential giant, 
Indonesia; from the impoverished ASEAN-4 to the wealthy Singapore and 
Brunei. Table 2.2 presents several basic economic indicators. 
The extreme disparity of ASEAN nations as shown in Table 2.2 raises 
several important questions. Experiences from other parts of the world, 
particularly Western Europe, demonstrate that (1) small states are often more 
active than large states in promoting integration (for example, the Benelux 
countries were often considered "core" members for each stage in the history 
of European integration); this is in contrast to the "hegemonic stability" 
theory, which holds that the existence of a hegemon, both willing and capable 
of shouldering the cost of maintaining an open system is the prerequisite to 
liberal economic regimes and institutions;20 (2) homogeneity - comparable 
levels of development, ideological affinity, and compatible political systems 
- facilitates successful "deep" integration; {3) deeper integration among the 
~xisting members is often considered helpful for, if not essential to, "shallow 
integration" with newer members who are characterized by greater 
heterogeneity (for example, EU's "growing pain" or "hiccups" in integrating · 
with the former communist countries of Eastern Europe). 
. ASEAN nations pride themselves for following certain "fundamental 
principles" in th1eir relations with one another, as adopted in the Treaty of 
Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, signed at.the First ASEAN 
Summit on 24 February 1976: 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
• The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
• Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
• Effective co-operation among themselves.21 
In January 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established to 
eliminate tariff barriers among the Southeast Asian countries with an aim of 
integrating the ASEAN economies into a single production base and creating 
a regional market of 500 million people. Under AFTA, tariff rates levied on 
a wide range of products traded within the region be reduced to no more than 
five per cent. Quantitative and other non-tariff barriers are to be eliminated. 
The newer members were expected to realize AFTA by 2006-10.22 
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TABLE 2.2 I~ China and ASEAN: Select Economic Indicators 
:::; 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam China ::J PJ I 
> 
Population V> m 
> (millions, 2001) 0.3 12.2 209.0 5.4 23.8 48.3 78.3 4.1 61.1 79.5 1,271.8 z 
GDP "Tl 
(US$ billions, 2001) NIA 3.4 145.3 1.8 88.0 14.2* 71.4 84.9 115.3 32.9 1,159.0 );! 
m 
GNI per capita ('\ 
}oil* 
0 
(US$, 2001) NIA 280 680 300 3,400 1,030 21,100 1,960 410 890 ::J 0 
PPP GDP 3 r;· 
(US$ bn, 2002 est.) 6.5 20.4 714.2 10.4 198.4 73.7 379.7 112.4 445.8 183.3 5,989.0 V> ii1' 
PPP GDP per capita ro-('\ (US$, 2002 estimates) 18,600 1,660 3,100 1,800 8,800 1,700* 4,600 25,200 7,000 2,700 4,700 ~ 
;::p 
Exports s., 
(US$ billions, 2001) 3.0 1.4 52.3 0.3 95.2 2.7 35.1 127.0 67.7 16.5 325.6 > 
-0 
Imports (!) PJ 
('\ (US$ billions, 2001) 1.4 1.7 32.l 0.6 76.8 2.5 33.5 113.0 58.l 16.8 295.3 (!) 
--
c: 
FD! inflows -> (US$ millions, 2000) NIA 125.7 --4,550.0 33.9 3,787.6 254.8 1,241.0 6,390.3 3,366.0 1,298.0 38,399.3 VI ('\ 
(!) 
::J 
Notes: * Estimates a.. PJ 
Sources: Author's compilation from World Bank Indicators Data Query <http://www.worldbank.org/dataldataquery.htmb, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Strategic ::J n 
Asia Database <http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/CView/>, and the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2003 <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ -< ~ 
index.html>. 
I 
~ 
<.n 
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Size is important, and China towers over each individual ASEAN member 
and all of them combined. AFTA intends to create a regional market of over 
500 million people. But the combined ASEAN magnitude would only 
constitute 29 per cent of the population, 32 per cent of the GDP, and 46 per 
cent of the trade volume, of the combined ASEAN-China FTA, which, with 
1.79 billion people, US$1.7 trillion in GDP, and US$1.36 trillion in trade 
volume, would become the world's largest FTA (calculated from Table 2.2). 
This is why there is a widely accepted view, expressed by former Singaporean 
Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo, that an integrated ASEAN is the 
only viable response to an economically-rising China.23 
Table 2.3 shows the major export and import partners of individual 
ASEAN members and China. This table shows several interesting patterns. 
Although China is among the top five trade partners for each ASEAN 
member, it is not the most important (Myanmar's import is the only 
exception); its importance to these nations is comparable to that of Taiwan's 
or South Korea's. In fact, the United States is the top export partner of five 
out of the ten ASEAN members (and the United States is also China's top 
export market); and Japan is the top import partner of four ASEAN nations 
(and Japan is also China's top import source). So, economic arguments are 
insufficient to explain ASEAN-China FTA. If economy of scale is the main 
concern, then ASEAN nations (and for that matter China itself) should 
pursue FTAs with their largest trade partners - the United States and 
Japan. The fact that the smaller economies band together - a kind of 
economic "balancing" - shows that the main impetus for the China-
ASEAN FTA is a political logic. The next section will examine some of the 
non-economic rationales for the ASEAN-FTA. 
Although China's trade with ASEAN may not be as large or important as 
ASEAN's trade with the United States or ASEAN-Japan trade, it nevertheless 
has increased rapidly in recent years. Citing ASEAN official figures, Table 2.4 
shows that from 1993 to 2001, total ASEAN export to China increased 
seven-fold, from US$4.5 billion to US$31.6 billion. During the same period, 
ASEAN import from China increased 5.5 times, from US$4.3 billion to 
US$23.8 billion. Two-way trade in 2001 stood at US$55.4 billion. 
Table 2.5, using official statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce, 
highlights the importance of ASEAN-China trade but also helps place it in 
perspective. It should be noted that Table 5 groups together trade data of all 
fifteen member states of 1he European Union as one entity and the ten 
members of ASEAN as one entity. This accounting method serves to give 
the allure of elevated importance for EU and ASEAN - hence, it is 
politically easier to sell the FTA to ASEAN as a whole and to show that 
China's trade flows to various markets are "balanced". According to this 
TABLE 2.3 
Major Trading Partners of ASEAN Nations and China r-0 
(Percentage shares of the country's exports I imports) 00 r;· 
s_ 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam China n 
:r 
Exporc partners Japan U.S. Japan Viecnam U.S. Thailand U.S. Malaysia U.S. U .S. U.S. ::l OJ 
(40.3) (60.2) (2 1) (26) (21) (31.4) (26.2) (17.4) (19.6) ( 15.2) (21.5) ). (/) 
S. Korea Germany U.S. T hailand Singapore U.S. Japan U.S. Japan Japan Hong Kong m > (12 .3) (9 .1) (13.2) (19) (17.4) (13) (14 .9) (15.3) (14.9) (14 .9) (18) z 
Thailand U.K. Singapore France Japan India C hina Hong Kong Singapore Australia Japan -n 
(12.1) (7 .1) (9.4) (7.5) (1 0.9) (7.4) (7 .4) (9.7) (8) (7.1) (14.9) ;;;! 
Australia Singapore S. Korea Germany China C hi na Taiwan Japan Hong Kong Ch ina S. Korea m 
(9.2) (4.4) (7.2) (5.3) (6.5) (4.7) (5.8) (7.1) (5 .4) (6.6) (4.8) (') 0 
U .S. Ch ina Hong Kong · Singapore China China Germany ::i 0 
(8 .1) (5. 1) (5) (5.7) (5 .5) (5.2) (6.5) 3 
China Taiwan Taiwan Malaysia Singapore ()' 
(6.4) (4.2) (4.9) (4) (5.5) tn ~ (ti 
Import partners Singapore T hailand Japan T ha iland Japan China Japan Malaysia Japan S. Korea Japan 
(') 
o:; 
(30.6) (24.8) (1 4) (59) (16.9) . (27) (2 1.6) (\ 8.2) (23) (12.7) (18.1) ;::::-
Japan Si ngapore Singapore Vietnam Singapore Singapore U.S. U.S. U.S. China Taiwan s_ 
(21.5) (16.9) (13.1) (12.3) (15.9) (19.5) (18.6) (14 .3) (9 .6) (12.2) (10.5) , 
"'1J 
Malaysia China U .S. C hina U.S. T hailand Singapore Japan C hina Japan S. Korea 11> OJ 
(17.4) (12 .1 ) (8.5) (7.9) (15.5) (12) (7.8) (12.5) (7.6) (12 . l) (9.7) (') 11> 
U .K. Hong Kong C hina China Malaysia S. Korea China Malaysia Singapore U.S. 2 
(6.1) (1 0.9) (7.8) (7.8) (9. 1) (7 .5) (7.6) (5 .6) (I 1.8) (9.2) )> 
H ong Kong S. Korea S. Korea S. Korea Taiwan C hina Taiwan Singapore Taiwan Germany V> (') 11> (14) (5.5) (5 .3) (5) (6 .3) (5 .7) (4.6) (4 .5) (1 0 .6) (5.6) ::i Q_ 
Taiwan Taiwan S. Kore:i Hong Kong T hailand Taiwan T hailand OJ 
::i (5 .1) (4.7) (5.3) (4 .5) (4 .6) (4.4) (5.4) (') 
T1iwan '<~ 
(4 .1) 
Sources: Author's compilation from CIA, The \Y'orld Fttcthook 2003 d1t1p://www.odci .gov/cia/pt1blications/factbook/index.htmb . 1~ 
TABlE 2.4 
ASEAN Trade with China by Country (1993-2001) 
ASEAN Export to China 
(Value in US$ Thousands) 
Export 
COUNTRY 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Brunei Darussalam - 37.l 152.2 115.4 0.0 0.0 244.2 22,270.0 127,741.3 
Cambodia - - - - - - - 285,985.0 224,984.2 
Indonesia 1,249,494.l 1,280,043.2 1,741,717.8 1,867,758.2 2,123,041.2 1,832,034.4 3,338,942.2 4,321,848.9 3,490,998.l 
Malaysia 1,202,628.5 1,859,707.4 1,806,866.6 1,519,935.5 1,313,812.7 1,545,082.2 4,595,865.8 6,433,437.9 6,229, 130.5 
Myanmar - - - - - - 65,076.9 86,525.3 - 103,700.5 
Philippines 173,874.0 163,967.0 212,938.6 327,921.7 244,411.6 343,682.6 2,521,925.8 2,570,611.5 2,372,582.0 
Singapore !, 902,697. 9 2,000,065.8 2,439,216.6 3,214,704.8 4,195 ,491.8 4,059,7 14.3 12,718,557.3 16,236,398.3 16,140,398.9 
Thailand - - - 543,696.6 1,291,132.0 1,422,072.6 3,231,764.2 5,077,586.6 2,862,555.! 
TOTAL 4,528,694.5 5,303,820.5 6,200,891.8 7,474,132.2 9,167,889.3 9,202,586.1 26,472,376.4 35,034,663.5 31,552,090.6 
Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999-2001 
t-.:1 
0) 
~ 
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ASEAN Import from China 
(Value in Thousand US$ Thousands) 
Import 
COUNTRY 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Brunei Darussalam - 34,931.4 63,336.5 72,500.2 55,090.6 20,620.9 72,415.9 84,958.9 97,356.l 
Cambodia - - - 364,110.9 203,774.4 
Indonesia 935,983.3 1,477,386.7 I ,495,223.3 1,235,458.7 1,518,013.9 904,459.4 1,469,664.0 2,364,323.0 2,099,989.6 
Malaysia 816,772.8 1,200,709.0 1,516,774.7 1,719,986.8 1,916,805.4 1,685,513.6 3,358,966.0 6,572,884.9 5,129,407.3 
Myanmar - - - - - - 223,665.3 261,734.9 394,914.4 
Philippines 180,662.9 294,046.6 475,876.6 676,506.8 871,565.5 I, 198,911.2 2,265,960.7 1,984,916.9 2,212,320.0 
Singapore 2,402,944.9 2,751,912.8 3,578,512.1 4,205,358.5 5,808,553.0 4,853,367.7 8,878,527.6 10,637,225.3 9,982,659.7 
Thailand - 1,307,809.3 3,312,855.6 2,548,662.2 3,138,797.8 4,210,755.3 3,712,652.5 
TOTAL 4,336,363.9 5,758,986.5 7,129,723.2 9,217,620.3 13,482,884.0 11,211,535.0 19,407,997.3 26,480,910.1 23,833,074.0 
Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999-2001 
Sources: ASEAN Trade Statistics data query <htrp://202.154.12.3/trade/publicview.asp>. 
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TABLE 2.5 
China's Top Ten Trading Partners 
Unit: US$ billions; percentages 
Overall trade Exports Imports 
Parco er Amount Share Partner Amount Share Parcner Amount Share 
1 Japan 133.6 15.7 U.S. 92.5 21.1 Japan 74.2 18.0 
2 U.S. 126.3 14.8 Hong Kong 76.3 i 7.4 E.U. 53.l 12.9 
3 E.U. 125.2 14.7 E.U. 72.2 16.5 Taiwan 49.4 12.0 
4 Hong Kong 87.4 10.3 Japan 59.4 13.6 A SEAN 47.3 11.S 
s ASEAN 78.3 9.2 ASEAN 30.9 7.1 S. Korea 43.1 10.4 
6 S. Korea 63.2 7.4 S. Korea 20.1 4.6 U.S. 33.9 8.2 
7 Taiwan 58.4 6.9 Taiwan 9.0 2.1 Hong Kong 11.1 2.7 
8 Russia 15.8 1.9 Australia 6.3 1.4 Russia 9.7 2.4 
9 Australia 13.6 1.6 Russia 6.0 1.4 Australia 7.3 1.8 
10 Canada 10.0 1.2 Canada 5.6 1.3 Brazil 5.8 1.4 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce of rhe People's Republic of China, "Top Ten Export Markecs", "Top Ten Import Sources", and "Top Ten Trade 
Partners" (all dared 18 February 2004), online at <http://english .mofcom.gov.cn/ arricle/200402/20040200183706_1.xml>, <http:// 
english.mofcom.gov.cn/arricle/200402/200402001837 44_1.xmb, and <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/arricle/200402/200402001824 58_1 .xmb. 
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table, ASEAN is China's fifth largest overall trade partner, constituting 9.2 
per cent of China's total trade; ASEAN is China's fifth largest export market 
and fourth most important import source. These more recent data, dated 
18 February 2004, show that China's total trade with ASEAN amounts to 
US$78.3 billion. 
To be sure, the United States remains the region's biggest trading partner, 
but trade between China and the rest of Asia is booming. Last October 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao urged Southeast Asian nations to achieve US$ I 00 
billion worth of trade with China before 2005 - almost double the 2001 
figure of US$55.4 billion. By comparison, U.S. trade with the ten members 
of ASEAN was US$120 billion in 2001. 24 The race is on. 
In sum, although increasing trade and investment ties have increased the 
economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, these relationships 
are still trailing the region's economic relationships with the United States, 
although the gap is narrowing. Although these economic facts justify an FTA, 
more important non-economic reasons explain why China "attaches great 
importance" to ASEAN-China FTA.25 
POLITICAL LOGIC OF HA: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT OF 
THE "PEACEFUL ASCENDANCY" POLICY 
Commentators have offered various explanations for the initiatives taken by 
China to sign an FTA with ASEAN countries. Most of these accounts invoke 
standard economic arguments or fall under the category of conventional 
wisdom. For example, Kevin Cai identifies the three most crucial rationales 
for the ASEAN-China FTA: (1) such an FTA helps craft a response to 
intensified regionalism elsewhere (Europe and North America), (2) FTA 
helps cement the growing economic ties between China and ASEAN, and (3) 
FTA helps co-ordinate government policies - a need made painfully clear by 
the Asian Financial Crisis. 26 
Employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on 
international parity conditions, James Laurenceson finds that China's 
integration with the ASEAN-5 is already relatively advanced with respect to 
goods and services markets and he argues that future benefits from liberalization 
will be mainly felt in financial markets. 27 
Focusing on the ASEAN's four newer countries, Thitapha 
Wattanapruttipaisan believes chat the ASEAN-China FTA will provide greater 
market access in resource- and agro-based products and some manufactured 
goods for the ASEAN-4, but will also see greater competition from China in 
both ASEAN-4's home and third-country markets.28 
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This chapter differs from all these theories by presenting a political 
logic of China's economic statecraft with respect to Southeast Asia. It 
argues that China's FTA with ASEAN countries is driven primarily by 
strategic considerations and that although the main instruments that it 
uses - FTAs - are economic, China's foremost goals are to ensure 
survival and to expand power - perennial core realist premises - in a 
changing (that is, more challenging) security environment. In short, 
China's FTA with ASEAN exemplifies the economic statecraft of China's 
"peaceful ascendancy". 
The concept of "economic statecraft" involves the utillzation of a state's 
economic tools (resources and capital) in its foreign policy conduct and is 
part of a state's statecraft - defined as the art of conducting state affairs. By 
employing either positive (rewards) or negative (sanctions) means, economic 
statecraft seeks to advance a state's interests through ways that are less coercive 
than military means.29 Although many scholars equate economic statecraft 
with economic sanctions and consequently question the validity of economic 
statecraft since "sanctions never work",30 positive incentives such as trade 
benefits or aid are no less of instruments for achieving a state's objectives and 
have not received the same amount of attention. 
China's FTA with ASEAN is a good example of this positive approach, 
and this kind of approach has arguably better achieved the very same goals 
than what China's previous approach could achieve. 
One of the most interesting developments to the scholarly and policy 
communities in the last two years is China's "new" foreign policy, which 
marks a significant departure from past practices in several key areas. 
Variously called "new diplomacy",31 "peaceful ascendancy" 32 or "peaceful 
rise"33 (hepingjueqz), "independent foreign policy of peace", or "pragmatic, 
balanced strategy in foreign policy" ,34 this new diplomacy contains several 
important elements.35 First, it is stimulated by globalization and is based on 
the conviction that __ China's growth imperatives are tied with globalization. 
It relies both on China's domestic economy and the international marketplace 
to sustain and fuel growth. Ch_ina's Fourth-Generation leaders36 have 
concluded that the international environment that China faces has changed 
and the country must respond "correctly to a world which is becoming 
multipolar, to economic globalization, and to the trend of development in 
scientific and technologic~l advancement". 37 Now is especially a "period of 
important strategic opportunity" for achieving China's paramount goal -
in the words of one analyst, "it is all part of a single-minded focus on 
e_conomic development oriented to making China an economic superpower 
in every respect ... in the next two decades". 38 
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Second, to achieve that goal, China must secure a peaceful international 
environment that is crucial to sustaining China's economic development 
and augmenting China's power. Peace in the Asia-Pacific region - China's 
backyard - is thus essential. Hence, China's "peaceful ascendancy" is 
designed to counter deep Asian apprehension about China as a competitor 
for trade, investment, and jobs. At a practical level, this means that when 
dealing with its most formidable challenger (the United States) , China 
must "bide its time and hide its capacities" (taoguang yanghur) - avoiding 
a premature showdown or confrontation with the United States, especially 
in light of the Bush administration's imperial strategy; and when dealing 
with its nervous neighbours, China muse replace its brusque "Great Power 
Diplomacy", which Third-Generation leaders like Jiang Zemin upheld, 
with a good-neighbour diplomacy. 
The timing is ideal. As the United States is distracted by the war on 
terror, Iraq, and North Korea, and Southeast Asia is still grappling with the 
aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China's peaceful rise presents 
an alternative policy agenda and opportunities to Southeast Asian nations. In 
light of America's single-~inded pursuit of its own narrow agenda and Japan's 
diminished stature, China's "charm offensive" coward Southeast Asia -
increasing investmem and trade, and proposing myriad of FTAs throughout 
Asia - has won much good will in the region.39 
Third, this new diplomacy is characterized by several important changes 
in style, if not substance: ( 1) ·lg.stead of acting like an aggrieved victim, China 
now aspires to be a responsible great power and is acting increasingly like one. 
(2) Whereas China used to distrust "multilateralism" for fear that multilateral 
institutions could be used to constrain or punish it, nowadays Chinese leaders 
recognize that deeply engaging these organizations help promote the country's 
trade and security interests and limit American power. For China, the word 
"multipolarity" sounds like a coded opposition to a world order characterized 
as "unipolar" (dominated by the United States) and to America's foreign 
policy style characterized as "unilateralism". (3) On many contentious and 
intractable issues; China has also adopted more pragmatic stances. On the 
South China Sea issue, China acceded to ASEAN's Tre~ty of Amity and Co-
operation (TAC) and promoted peaceful dialogue over territorial disputes. 
On Taiwan, China has replaced its military bluster with economic enticement. 
(4) China is more aware that its rise has consequences for the Asia-Pacific 
region and beyond. So it is keen on easing the concerns of various countries. 
(5) China has become much more actively engaged in, and seeks to shape, 
regional affairs. Its hosting of the Six-Party Talk over North Korea's nuclear 
issue is a good example. 
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Fourth, the major instrument used in advancing China's fundamental 
objectives is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal economic 
growth, rapidly expanding domestic market, and voracious appetite for raw 
materials for its economic development. FTA with ASEAN helps cultivate 
goodwill among China's important neighbours, maintain peace and security 
in the region, defuse American influence, and secure key markets and raw 
materials needed for China's economic security. It is thus a sine qua non of 
"peaceful ascendancy'' - the fundamental strategy of China's new diplomacy 
for survival and development. 
To sum up, China's "peaceful ascendancy" is a comprehensive long-term 
strategy employing globalization as catalyst to accelerate China's economic 
development and elevate China's power and stature. The language is peace 
and stability, the style is constructive diplomacy, and the substance is economics 
- at least for now. 40 The key is ascendancy. The theory leaves open the 
question what happens after China has ascended: Will it have been 
fundamentally altered to become a status quo power as a result of the process 
of peaceful rise and embrace of globalization? Or will China now have the 
power to throw its weight around? In other words, is peace an end in China's 
theory of "peaceful rise" or simply a means for achieving ascendancy? No 
definitive answer can be ascertained at this moment, since the actual outcome 
is most likely some combination of these two views, and in any case is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
China's FTA exemplifies the economic statecraft of this overall strategy. 
Geopolitics, rather than purely economic reasons, drives China to proactively 
conduct trade talks. The hallmarks of China's arrival as a major player in 
world and regional affairs include: (1) using multilateralism co counter what 
China considers U.S. unilateralism, (2) talking of the need for a new 
international political and economic order (multipolarity), and (3) promoting 
an East Asia pact to match European and North American free trade 
agreements. 
ASEAN'S CALCULUS AND FTA'S IMPLICATIONS 
What is the calculus for ASEAN nations regarding their FTA with China? 
How will this FTA impact ASEAN members? How will it affect regional and 
international balance of pqwer? On the first question, this chapter suggests 
three fundamental reasons why ASEAN embrace the FTA with China. 
'First, each individual ASEAN member is too weak vis-a-vis China. To 
augment their bargaining power, ASEAN members must pool their resources 
together so as to overcome the very plausible collective action problem. 
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Facing an economically rising China, these nations conclude that if they are 
to have any hope of luring foreign investments, they need co trumpet their 
growing ties with Asia's next giant.41 
Second, individual ASEAN members clearly see PTA with China as a 
logical step coward partaking in China's growing domestic market, made 
increasingly prosperous because of China's entry into the WTO (in December 
2001) and the benefits arising from the phasing-in of China's pledged 
liberalization. China's offer of "early harvest" - a unilateral goodwill measure 
that would aid the less developed ASEAN nations (called ASEAN-4) in trade 
facilitation .and would enable mutually beneficial adjustments ahead of the 
general schedule for the rest of ASEAN - is especially appealing co them. 
Third, ASEAN nations see the PTA with China as a catalyst to acceierating 
tl;eir own integration (AFTA)42 and a ploy with which to engage larger 
trading partners, such as Japan, the United States, and the EU. Already, 
ASEAN-China PTA is causing some concerns for Japan, and prompts Tokyo 
to redouble its endeavour in engaging an area that it has traditionally 
dominated. For example, in its summit meeting with ASEAN in December 
2003, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged US$3 billion in 
new aid to Southeast Asia (the region is already receiving 60 per cent of its 
overseas aid from Japan) , and promised to work with the region to maintain 
security ties, liberate trade, and create a broad "economic parcnership".43 
Interestingly, some analysts view Japan's new emphasis on fostering closer 
relations with ASEAN as being driven by one major consideration - not to 
be outdone by China.44 
Even this cursory survey of ASEAN's riiotivation for FTA with China, 
limited by space, raises three important questions about the impact of the 
PTA on ASEAN. 
First, China could turn out to be a fierce competitor. Rodolfo Severino, 
ASEAN's secretary-general, is aware that such industries as textiles, toy, and 
motorcycle manufactures will be negatively affected in the shore term, but he 
believes long-term benefits will follow.45 Because of its almost inexhaustible 
unskilled labour and huge amounts of FDI, China may pose a particularly 
great challenge to the ASEAN-4 in their home or thi~d-country markets. 
Currently China is receiving the lion's share of FDI inflows to the entire 
developing world. As Table 1 shows, in 2000, China received more than three 
times the combined total of FD I inflows to the ten ASEAN nations. The FDI 
that is currently going into China (arguably motivated by the intrinsic value 
of China as an investment site) is unlikely to be distracted by an PTA with 
ASEAN, whereas some of the FDI going into ASEAN now may end up going 
into China (because of the region's new ties with the larger market). A caveat 
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1s m order. Chinese companies are keen on investing in Southeast Asia, 
especially in the resources sectors. This may mitigate China's competition for 
FDI with ASEAN somewhat. 
Second, there are real concerns that ASEAN-China FTA may undermine 
AFTA. Some worry that China may distract a core trading group from 
pursuing its better interests by offering an FTA. These skeptics question 
whether China's real motivation is actually domination, as opposed to 
integration, and this could cause the ASEAN to fail to complete its own full 
integration, and instead try to cash in on the alluring Chinese economy.46 
This is especially true in that compared to China, which has a very dear 
strategic goal, as discussed earlier, ASEAN does not have a dear picture about 
its place in the new strategic environment of an emergent China. One 
Australian analyst thinks that under these circumstances the best that ASEAN 
can do is to lock itself in as a fringe player on the spokes of China's regional 
trade architecture, while further enhancing the attractiveness of China as the 
hub for regional investment and production.47 
A historical metaphor is illustrative here. Historians John King Fairbank 
and Merle Goldman argue that traditional China, seeing itself as the superior 
Middle Kingdom, carried out its foreign policy based on a tribute system, 
which was a "reciprocal foreign relationship between superior and inferior" in 
that tribute offerings were normally reciprocated by lavish gifts from the 
emperor; hence, "accepting China's supremacy was materially worthwhile". 
In addition, the tribute system early became the institutional setting and 
indeed "cover for foreign trade".48 Another scholar points out that China and 
its tributaries had far more interaction with each other than it commonly 
acknowledged. "Trade, both private and tributary, made up a significant 
portion of both government revenues and GNP. Under this system, these 
countries were a thriving, complex, and vibrant regional order" and the 
tributary system was "a form of disguised staple trade" .49 
This historical metaphor on the China-centric tribute system is at the 
heart of a current debate in International Relations - whether a hierarchical 
regional order in East Asia dominated by a rising China promotes more 
stability or instability. David Kang argues that East Asian regional relations 
have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those 
in the West, and that when China has been strong and stable, order has been 
preserved.50 He argues th~t: 
East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among 
nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as 
the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary 
states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate 
war. 51 
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Theorizing on why China has successfully managed its relationship with 
Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian nations have increasingly accepted a 
normal China, Brantly Womack argues that China's successful diplomatic 
dealing with Southeast Asia during the reform era is mainly a result of China's 
successful exercise of leadership in its relationship with Southeast Asia - a 
relationship characterized by asymmetry. 52 
To argue that China's FTA with ASEAN evokes the- ancient tributary 
system and threatens to institutionalize China's dominant position and 
ASEAN's subordinate status in the form of trade obviously risks the charge 
of being a false historical analogy. However, the analogy is not entirely 
inappropriate, either, as Kang's and Womack's lines seem to suggest. The 
Chinese are a history-minded people. After all, until recently their foreign 
policy was driven by the legacy of "century of humiliation". The main 
difference is that in the past, the Chinese believed in their cultural supremacy 
and cared more about the other peoples' acknowledgement of China's 
cultural eminence than actual conquest (again, Kang's description "formal 
hierarchy vs. informal equality") - in other words, the learning is only 
one-way. Today, China exists in a globalized world, and to survive in an 
increasingly challenging environment, China has proved that occasionally 
it can be a fast learner. Ir is learning the new rules and playing the new 
games. Learning is now two-way. Liking the FTA to the modern-day tribute 
system may be an exaggeration, but calling it the economic statecraft of 
China's "peaceful ascendancy" in light of China's fundamental goal of rising 
to preeminent power is a historically apt perspective. 
As constructionists would like to point out, the structure of elites' beliefs 
and interests determine whether anarchy is conflictual or co-operative,53 it is 
therefore inadequate to simply infer China's real intention from its behaviour. 
As China is seeking peaceful ascendancy, other countries hope that this 
portends a positive development and can thus interpret its · more 
accommodating new diplomacy as a fundamental shift. However, the available 
evidence is not sufficient to warrant this optimism. After all, the Chinese 
seem to offer only a tactical reason for their restraint - "biding one's time 
and hiding one's capabilities". What will they do after d~ey achieve their goal 
of becoming an economic superpower? \Xi'ill economic success breed an 
aggressive nationalism? Will it convince Chinese leaders that China can 
finally take on the United States and turn the rwenry-first century world 
order to Pax Sinica? 
No one knows. Clearly with history in mind, U.S. Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick recently said that China's increasing economic power and 
global influence must be integrated into the international communiry. 54 This 
is not just good economics; it is also good politics. 
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